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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) and Utah 
R. App. P. 5. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the Governmental Immunity Act's retained immunity for injuries 
arising out of the construction or operation of storm systems shields UDOT from liability 
for an accident caused by standing water on a freeway, even where the storm system did 
not cause the water to accumulate on the freeway. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is 
reviewed de novo. Kg,, Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998); 
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-30U5)(n): 
(5) Immunity is not waived under Subsections (3) and (4) if the 
injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from: 
(n) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm 
systems. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied UDOT's motion for summary judgment, because 
UDOT did not establish that the accident that killed Jenna Barenbrugge was caused by or 
arose out of the construction, repair, or operation of a flood or storm system. To the con-
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trary, the evidence was clear that the accident was not caused by a storm system, but 
rather by rain water accumulating on the freeway. 
UDOT basically ignores this key fact, arguing that it is immune under the pro-
vision at issue because the Barenbrugges1 claim supposedly implicates the "failure to 
construct a drainage system" or a "failure to operate the system" properly. But the statute 
does not furnish immunity for the failure to construct, repair, or operate a storm system. 
When the legislature has intended immunity to apply to the failure to take certain actions, 
the legislature has made that intent clear, as shown by three other immunity provisions in 
the Governmental Immunity Act. The legislature's refusal to include the "failure" lan-
guage in § 63-30d-301(5)(n) thus demonstrates that the legislature did not intend for 
entities to be immune from liability for failing to construct, repair, or operate flood or 
storm systems. 
It would be improper to expand the storm system exception to cover the present 
case. As UDOT itself acknowledges, the statute at issue must be applied according to its 
plain language. Further, there is no authority for UDOT's expansive reading of the 
statute. Finally, such an expansive reading would be illogical and lead to absurd results. 
That a storm system was in place along 1-215, with a drainage box 100 feet from 
the accident site, does not support extending immunity to UDOT. Once again, the storm 
system itself had no causal relationship to the accident; the accident would have hap-
pened exactly the same way if the drain box had been 200 or 2000 feet from the accident 
site, or if the storm system had not been there at all. Further, any interpretation of the 
statute that would allow immunity whenever a storm system was "near" the site of an 
accident would be unworkable. 
Finally, even if UDOT had managed to show that the present situation is covered 
by the language or intent of § 63-30d-301(5)(n), the judgment would still have to be 
affirmed, as UDOT cannot obtain immunity from damages caused by its own failure to 
provide a safe highway. Ensuring highway safety is a "core function" of UDOT, and it 
would be absurd to apply the storm system exception, which was adopted in response to 
the 1983 floods, to cover UDOT's failure to keep drivers safe on 1-215 after a rain storm. 
Accordingly, the Barenbrugges ask that the trial court's judgment be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED UDOT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE UDOT FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT IT 
IS IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party establishes "[1] that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and [2] that the moving party is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The movant must submit sufficient 
evidence or otherwise establish its right to judgment. The movant has an "affirmative 
burden," Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 1993), and if he or 
she fails to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the motion must be 
denied. Kg,, Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 752 (Utah 1996) (because 
movant's affidavit failed to negate existence of disputed issue of fact, non-movant had no 
burden to present evidence in response on that issue). Thus, because UDOT is appealing 
from the denial of a motion for summary judgment, UDOT faces a steep burden on this 
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appeal, in that UDOT must establish that based on the undisputed facts presented below, 
it is immune from liability for Jenna Barenbrugge's death as a matter of law. UDOT has 
not met this burden. 
UDOT's summary judgment motion did not challenge the Barenbrugges' allega-
tions that UDOT had a duty to provide a safe freeway, that UDOT breached that duty on 
August 3, 2004, or that UDOT's breach caused the accident that killed Jenna. (See R. 43-
48, 66-67.) Thus, the allegations in the Barenbrugges' complaint are accepted as estab-
lished for purposes of this motion. See Wilkinson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 975 P.2d 464, 
465 (Utah 1998) (where movant presented no evidence to controvert allegations of com-
plaint, non-movant plaintiff may rely on those allegations in summary judgment pro-
ceeding). UDOT sought summary judgment on the ground that the Barenbrugges' claim 
was barred under two provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act (the "Act"): Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)(m), which states that the Act does not waive the immunity of 
governmental entities for injuries that arise out of "the management of flood waters"; and 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)(n), which retains immunity for damages arising from 
"the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems." (See R. 67.) 
On appeal, UDOT no longer claims immunity under § 301(5)(m), the "manage-
ment of flood waters" provision; instead, UDOT relies entirely on § 30 l^Xn).1 (See, 
e.g., UDOT Br. at 8 (quoting § 301(5)(n), but not § 301(5)(m)).) Thus, UDOT cannot 
1
 Having failed to present an argument based on § 63-30d-301(5)(m) in its opening 
brief, UDOT is precluded from presenting such an argument in its reply brief. See State 
v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, ffi[ 20-21, 6 P.3d 1116. UDOT has thus abandoned, for purposes 
of this appeal, any reliance on that provision. 
A _ 
prevail on this appeal unless it can establish that as a matter of law, it is immune from 
liability because Jenna's fatal accident arose out of "the construction, repair, or operation 
of flood or storm systems." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)(n).2 C£ Pigs Gun Club v. 
San Pete County, 2002 UT 17,116, 42 P.3d 379 (whether activity can be characterized 
as construction, repair, or operation of flood system is a question of fact). UDOT has not 
established that this provision bars the Barenbrugges1 claim, nor can it. 
A. The plain language of Section 63-30d-301(5)(n) defeats UDOTfs argument. 
UDOT spends much of its brief asserting that the statutory provision at issue is not 
ambiguous and must be applied according to its plain language, but UDOT does not 
actually apply that plain language to the facts of this case. UDOT has utterly failed to 
show how Jenna's death arose out of the "construction, repair, or operation" of any "flood 
or storm system," nor does the record support such a conclusion. 
First, there is no evidence that the construction or repair of any flood or storm 
system caused Jenna's death. Indeed, the record contains no evidence regarding the con-
struction or repair of any flood or storm system at all, or any evidence explaining how the 
construction or repair of such a system could have caused Jenna's death. UDOT merely 
asserts that a storm system was in place along the highway, with a grate 100 feet from the 
point where Jenna's car crashed into the bridge support, but does not explain when this 
2
 The Barenbrugges agree with UDOT that the outcome of this case is controlled 
by the application of the third step in the traditional three-step analysis Utah courts follow 
in addressing governmental immunity issues. (See UDOT Br. at 8-10.) The Baren-
brugges agree that the activity of maintaining a freeway is a governmental function under 
the Act, and UDOT has conceded that the Act generally waives immunity for injuries 
arising out of the defective condition of a freeway. 
- 5 -
system was built, or last repaired, whether any construction or repairs were going on any-
time near August 3, 2004, or how any construction or repair could have caused the 
accumulation of the water on 1-215. 
Similarly, UDOT cites no evidence that the operation of a flood or storm system 
caused Jenna's death. Once again, there was a storm system somewhat nearby, but there 
is no evidence that the operation of that storm system caused the accident. This is not a 
case where a flood or storm system backed up, causing water to pool and/or overflow 
onto the highway. Rather, the standing water that killed Jenna undeniably came from 
rain falling directly onto the highway. The storm system simply had nothing to do with 
the accident. Thus, under the plain language of § 63-30d-301(5)(n), UDOT is not entitled 
to immunity. 
UDOT does not even attempt to explain how the plain language of § 63-30d-
301(5)(n) applies to the Barenbrugges' claim. Instead, UDOT merely asserts that because 
the Barenbrugges acknowledge that standing water on the freeway caused the accident, 
their claim "necessarily implicates either a failure to construct a drainage system ade-
quately to prevent excess water on the roadway or a failure to operate the system to pre-
vent an accumulation, or both." (UDOT Br. at 14.) UDOT's argument thus appears to be 
that because an effective storm system could have prevented Jennafs accident, the 
accident was caused by the operation of a storm system. This argument fails for at least 
two reasons. 
First, UDOT has not presented any evidence to support its assertion. UDOT has 
not shown - and certainly has not established as a matter of law - that a properly 
operating storm system actually would have prevented Jennafs accident. Nor has UDOT 
established that a storm system was the only way to prevent Jenna's accident. Indeed, it 
is plausible that UDOT could have prevented the accident through other means, including 
changes to the highway to prevent water from collecting in the lane, closing the lane in 
response to the storm, using a different kind of pavement, or other preventative measures. 
It would therefore be pure speculation for this Court to conclude that the Barenbrugges' 
claim "necessarily implicates" a storm system failure. 
Second, and most critically, even if UDOT were correct as a factual matter, UDOT 
still would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law, because UDOT's argument that 
it is immunized against liability for injuries resulting from the failure to construct or 
operate a storm system flies in the face of the plain language of the statute. 
As quoted above, the statute provides immunity for injuries caused by the actual 
"operation" (or construction or repair) of a storm system. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-
301(5)(n). The Act, by its own language, does not provide immunity for a governmental 
entity's failure to construct, repair, or operate a storm system. See id. This cannot be 
construed as a mere oversight, either: Three other subdivisions of § 63-30d-301(5) ex-
pressly state that a governmental entity is immune for taking "or the failure to" take 
certain actions. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)(a) (immunity is not waived if the 
injury results from "the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or perform, a 
discretionary function"); Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)(c) (immunity not waived for 
"the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to issue, 
deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar 
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authorization"); Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)(q) (immunity not waived for "the exer-
cise or performance, or the failure to exercise or perform, any function pursuant to Title 
73, Chapter 10, Board of Water Resources—Division of Water Resources"). 
Had the legislature intended to extend immunity to an entity's failure to construct, 
repair, or operate a storm system, the legislature certainly knew how to make that intent 
explicit. Accordingly, the legislature's refusal to retain immunity for the "failure to 
construct, repair, or operate" a flood or storm system defeats UDOT's attempt to escape 
liability for Jenna's death. 
B. Section 63-30d-301(5)(n)'s exception to the immunity waiver should not be 
extended to cover this situation. 
It would be improper to extend the flood or storm system provision beyond its 
plain language to immunize UDOT from liability for its failure to construct, repair, or 
operate a storm system. As UDOT itself argues at length in its brief, the statute is not 
ambiguous. (See UDOT Br. at 10-13.) UDOT even cites several cases holding that the 
statute should be interpreted according to its plain language and that the language of the 
statute must be read as a whole. (See id.) The Barenbrugges agree: Section 63-30d-
301(5)(n) is not ambiguous, and therefore should be applied in accordance with its plain 
language, which clearly does not relieve governmental entities for liability for injuries 
caused by their negligent failures to build or operate storm systems. 
Moreover, exceptions to the Governmental Immunity Act's waiver of immunity 
are to be narrowly construed. Cf Johnson v. UDOT, 2006 UT 15, \ 19, 133 P.3d 402 
(discretionary function exception to immunity waiver is construed narrowly). In addition 
_ a _ 
to requiring the Court to rewrite the statute, extending the immunity waiver to this case 
would deny the Barenbrugges compensation for the tragic loss of their daughter. It 
would simply be wrong to deny compensation to obviously injured plaintiffs unless such 
a denial is compelled by the statute itself. And, as explained above, the statute itself does 
not support such an outcome. 
UDOT has not cited a single case or other authority that would support extending 
the immunity waiver to cover UDOT's failure to build or operate a storm system at the 
point of the accident. The closest UDOT comes is Cook v. Moroni, 2005 UT App 40, 
107 P.3d 713, in which this Court held that the "flood or storm systems" exception to the 
waiver of immunity barred the plaintiffs' claim against a city when their property was 
flooded after a drainage system backed up. In that case, the city's storm system original-
ly used 18-inch pipes on both sides of a street, but the city had replaced one of the 18-
inch pipes with a 4-inch pipe. Id. ^} 2-3. The water carried by the system backed up and 
overflowed, causing damage to the plaintiffs' house. Id. 13. This Court agreed with the 
trial court that the city was immune under the provision at issue in the present case 
because the loss was caused by the construction or operation of the storm system. 
3
 For the most part, the cases UDOT cites have no bearing on the issues presented 
in this appeal. For example, UDOT relies heavily on Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. 
Dist. 849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993); Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist, 927 P.2d 159 (Utah 
1996); and Blackner v. UDOT, 2002 UT 44, 48 P.3d 949, for the proposition that 
immunity applies as long as the conduct covered by the immunity provision is a "but for" 
cause of the incident that led to the plaintiffs injuries. But none of these cases dealt with 
the storm system provision that governs the present case. Further, in each of those cases, 
the conduct covered by the applicable immunity provision (assault and/or battery in 
Ledfors and Taylor; a natural condition on public lands in Blackner) directly caused the 
injuries. In our case, the operation of a storm system was not a direct cause of Jenna's 
accident; the storm system did not affect the accident at all 
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In Cook, however, the water that damaged the plaintiffs1 home was brought there 
by the storm system itself. Thus, in Cook the damage actually did Marise[] out of, in con-
nection with [sic], or resultf] from" the construction or operation of the storm system with 
the 4-inch pipe. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301(5). In contrast, UDOT has presented no 
evidence that the water that had collected on 1-215 when Jenna approached the 1300 East 
bridge was carried there by a storm system; instead, as noted above, the water came 
directly from rain falling onto the freeway. 
Expanding storm system immunity to cover instances in which a storm system 
could have prevented the accident would lead to absurd results. To begin with, this novel 
interpretation of immunity would have to cover every instance of injury or property 
damage caused in any way by the accumulation of water on a highway or other public 
property, because any time such water is present, one can theorize that a storm system 
would have prevented the water from being there. For example, suppose UDOT allowed 
snowmelt to flow freely onto one of the highways in Big or Little Cottonwood Canyon, 
and failed to salt or sand the highway to prevent the snowmelt from freezing at night, and 
a driver was injured or killed by the resulting black ice. Under UDOT's proposed 
interpretation of the storm system immunity provision, UDOT could avoid liability by 
arguing that the accident arose from the operation of a floor or storm system because 
such a system could have prevented the injuries. Similarly, if UDOT allowed water to 
accumulate repeatedly on a freeway overpass, and the freezing and thawing of that water 
caused concrete to fall from the overpass, killing a driver on the freeway, UDOT would 
be able to avoid liability by arguing that a storm system on the overpass would have 
prevented the concrete deterioration. 
Not only would UDOT's proposed interpretation of § 63-30d-301(5)(n) lead to 
absurd results, but such an interpretation would also put litigants in an untenable position. 
In such cases, UDOT would have to argue that it could have put a storm system where 
the water accumulated, and the plaintiff would have to argue that such a system would 
not have been feasible, or that it would not have prevented the accumulation. In other 
words, to take advantage of the exception to the immunity waiver, UDOT would 
essentially have to prove its own negligence in failing to install a storm system at the 
appropriate place, and the plaintiff would have to prove that UDOT was not negligent. 
Yet in arguing the underlying question of liability, UDOT and the plaintiff would have to 
switch sides. This situation would create a strong incentive for gamesmanship on the part 
of all parties to any litigation involving injuries or property damage caused by the 
accumulation of water, and should be avoided if at all possible. 
Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Pigs Gun Club suggests that it would 
not be proper to extend storm system immunity as UDOT asks. Pigs Gun Club, 2002 UT 
17, 42 P.3d 379. In Pigs Gun Club, the plaintiffs' property was damaged when the Sevier 
River backed up where it crossed under a county road. The River ordinarily flowed 
through a culvert under the road, but during the spring runoff the river level rose and the 
road blocked the flow, causing the water to back up onto the plaintiffs' property. The 
trial court granted summary judgment for the county, finding that the county was immune 
under various provisions, including both the flood water management provision UDOT 
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argued below and the storm system provision UDOT relied on below and relies on here. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact precluded 
entry of judgment for the county as a matter of law. See id. fflf 19, 21,24. 
In Pigs Gun Club, a more effective flood or storm system could have prevented 
the water from backing up, and thus could have prevented the plaintiffs' property damage. 
Thus, the holding in Pigs Gun Club appears to foreclose UDOT's position that UDOT is 
immune as a matter of law because the Barenbrugges' claims supposedly "necessarily 
implicate" the failure to either build or operate an effective a storm system. 
UDOT may argue, in response, that it is not contending that a governmental entity 
should be immune under § 63-30d-301(5)(n) for all injuries or damage arising out of 
accumulations of water, but only for injuries or damage caused by accumulations or 
water that are somewhat near an existing storm system. That would explain UDOT's reli-
ance on "[t]he presence of the drainage system at the site of the accident" as a reason for 
avoiding liability. (UDOT Br. at 14.) But as explained above, the drainage system along 
1-215 had no actual causal relationship to the accident, because there is no evidence that 
the water on the highway at the location of the accident came from the drainage system. 
And because the drainage system had no causal relationship to the accident, there is no 
basis in policy or logic to distinguish between having that drainage system "nearby" and 
having no drainage system at all. 
Further, even if there were some logical reason why a nearby drainage system 
would be enough to shield UDOT from liability, what standard could be used to define 
"nearby"? UDOT notes that there was a drainage gate 100 feet from the point of final 
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impact, but UDOT presents no evidence that would allow a court to determine whether 
100 feet is "close enough" to allow UDOT to claim immunity. 
The record contains no evidence as to whether 100 feet is a large or small gap 
compared to highway drainage systems in general. If UDOT is immune from liability 
because it placed a drainage box 100 feet from the accident site, would it also be immune 
if the drain box were 1000 feet away? If 1000 feet is close enough, then why not 2000 
feet, or even a mile? Additionally, even if a court had a basis for determining whether 
the drain box was close enough to the accident site, there is also no evidence that would 
enable a court to determine whether the drain box in the present case was large enough, 
whether it was situated properly, or whether "single underground pipe" (UDOT Br. at 14) 
connecting the drain boxes was sufficient to handle expected storm water flow. If, in 
fact, immunity were to depend on whether UDOT had a storm system relatively near the 
site of the accident, then all of these questions would have to be answered in order to 
determine UDOT's liability in any given situation. Such a standard would be unworkable 
and illogical. 
Finally, adopting UDOT's position would be detrimental to public safety. If the 
mere presence of a storm drain nearby were enough to immunize UDOT from liability as 
a matter of law, then UDOT could avoid liability for accidents caused by water 
accumulation by simply placing drain boxes along its roadways without any need to 
worry about whether those drain boxes and the pipes connecting them were adequate or 
even functional. The Barenbrugges respectfully submit that the Court should not inter-
pret the law to create such absurd results. Given that no statutory or case law requires the 
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Court to interpret the Act in such a fashion, the Barenbrugges further submit that the 
Court should simply reject UDOT's argument that the presence of the drainage system 
near the place where Jenna was killed is enough to immunize UDOT from liability as a 
matter of law. 
C. Even if UDOT could establish as a matter of law that Jenna's accident arose 
from the construction or operation of a storm or flood system, UDOT still 
would not be entitled to summary judgment. 
"The duty to ensure highway safety is a core function of UDOT and is non-
delegable." Johnson v. UDOT, 2004 UT App 284, ^ 14, 98 P.3d 773, affd on other 
grounds, 2006 UT 15, 133 P.3d 402. The Barenbrugges are not suing because of what 
UDOT did with rainwater, but rather because UDOT failed in this duty. In particular, at 
6:55 p.m. on August 3, 2004, the portion of westbound 1-215 approaching the 1300 East 
bridge was simply unsafe for highway travel. Even if this unsafe condition were caused 
by the backup of water from a storm system, and thus fell within the scope of § 63-30d-
301(5)(n), it would still be inappropriate to immunize UDOT from liability. 
Immunity for the construction, repair, or operation of storm or flood systems 
traces back to the statutes adopted in response to the unusual flooding that occurred 
throughout Utah in the spring of 1983. See Branam v. Provo Sch. Dist, 780 P.2d 810, 
812-13 (Utah 1989); Provo City v. UDOT, 795 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1990). The 
purpose of adding that immunity was to protect governmental entities from the over-
whelming liability that could result from another catastrophic event, where a massive 
snowmelt could cause culverts, storm lines, and other aspects of storm water management 
systems to become clogged or overburdened. There is no reason to think that in adopting 
i / i _ 
the predecessor to § 63-30d-301(5)(n), the Legislature intended to immunize a highway 
authority from liability for accidents like the one that killed Jenna, i.e., those caused by a 
large puddle forming on a freeway after a downpour. 
In Williams v. Carbon County Bd. of Educ, 780 P.2d 816 (Utah 1989), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the predecessor to § 63-30d-301(5)(n) did not immunize a 
school district from liability for a homeowner's damages caused by runoff from a school 
parking lot. The court held that the school's activities "simply do not come within the 
contemplation of the provision, and that "[w]e do not believe it was the legislature's 
intention in enacting the 1984 amendment to shield defendant from possible liability for 
damages arising from its negligence in the resurfacing of a parking lot." Id. at 818. 
Similarly, in this case, there is absolutely no reason to believe that by enacting a general 
provision regarding immunity for the operation of a storm system, the legislature in-
tended to shield UDOT from liability for damages caused by its failure to ensure that 
Interstate 215 was reasonably safe.4 
4
 UDOT points out that in Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist. 2002 UT 130, ^ 59, 63 
P.3d 705, a three-judge majority of the Utah Supreme Court indicated that they disagreed 
with the reasoning of Williams. However, even though the Lovendahl court declined to 
extend Williams to the situation presented there (which had nothing to do with storm or 
flood water management), the court did not overrule Williams. See M. Williams thus 
remains good law. 
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CONCLUSION 
Neither the language nor the purpose of § 63-30d-301(5)(n) support UDOT's claim 
of immunity. The Barenbrugges therefore respectfully request that the Court affirm the 
trial court's judgment and remand the matter for trial. 
DATED: February 2 ,2007. 
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